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MAJOR D'OH: OIRA'S INFLUENCE OVER THE EPA'S
REGULATORY DECISION MAKING IN RJVERKEEPER,
INC. V EPA
I. INTRODUCTION
Russ Cargill [Head of the EPA]: "When you made me
head of EPA you were applauded for appointing one of
the most successful men in America to the least successful
Agency in Government. And why did I take the job? Cause
I'm a rich man who wanted to give back. Not the money.
But something. So here's our chance to kick some ass for
mother earth."
President A. Schwarzenegger: "I'm listening."
Mr. Cargill: "I've narrowed the choices down to five un-
thinkable options. Each will cause untold misery-"
(interrupted)
President: "I pick number 3!!!"
Mr. Cargill: "You don't even want to read them first?"
President: "I was elected to lead, not to read. NUMBER
3!!"'
Recent political debacles involving poor executive decisions
have left Americans increasingly skeptical about federal officials'
decision-making abilities.2 All farce aside, the irritating truth re-
mains: the current executive branch's decision-making process has
1. THE SIMPSONS MOVIE (20th Century Fox 2007). The plot for the THE SIMP-
SONS MOVIE was based on a recent lawsuit that creator Matt Groening had read
about, in which a town was having problem with raw waste being dumped into the
town's waterways. See Dan Snierson, Homer's Odyssey, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY,
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,2 0 0 3 5 2 8 5 _20035331_20047512,00.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2008). The main defendant was a company called Cargill, which is a
major pork products producer. See Cargill.com, About Us, http://www.cargill.
com/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2008) (describing company's business
products and ventures). The fictional character Russ Cargill could be a jab from
the creators of the movie, illustrating a perceived control that economic actors
have over the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and executive branch.
2. See PollingReport.com, President Bush and the Bush Administration,
http://www.pollingreport.com/bush.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2008) (listing public
polling reports concerning President Bush and Bush administration's approval rat-
ings with regard to recent actions and policies). A CNN/USA Today poll closed in
March 2006 indicated that seventy three percent of Americans believe big business
has too much influence over decisions made by the Bush Administration, and fifty
(357)
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often revealed itself as nothing more than a display of capital con-
servation and presidential muscle-flexing.
A recent example of questionable decision making arose in
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA (Riverkeeper I1),3 a case involving EPA regula-
tions under the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act). 4 The CWA was
enacted in 1977 and reflected a growing public concern about the
United States' waterways. 5 The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is the sole authority responsible for administering the Act.6
Since its inception, courts have questioned the EPA's ability to pro-
mulgate effective regulations under the Act. 7
The Second Circuit's recent decision in Riverkeeper H addressed
a challenge from environmental, state, and industry petitioners re-
garding several EPA provisions set forth under § 316(b) of the
CWA.8 The Second Circuit remanded a majority of the provisions
for revision, finding that they were not in compliance with the plain
text of the statute, lacked sufficient analytical support from the ad-
ministrative record, and impermissibly used cost-benefit analysis.9
Several critics have suggested that both the lack of analytical sup-
port and the improper use of cost-benefit analysis are direct corol-
laries of closed door meetings, during which the Office of Internal
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) impermissibly interfered with the EPA's
regulatory duties. 1°
This Note focuses on the Second Circuit's decision in
Riverkeeper II. Part II of this Note recounts the facts of Riverkeeper II,
including the arguments presented and the Second Circuit's hold-
eight percent believe President Bush is not paying enough attention to what his
Administration is doing. See id.
3. 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007).
4. See id. at 89 (stating generally petitioners' challenge to EPA promulgated
rule under CWA); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2001) (detailing CWA). In this
Note statutory provisions in the text note the CWA citing to a parallel correspond-
ing codified section of the USC.
5. For a further discussion of the background of the CWA, see infra notes 33-
35 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of the background of the EPA, see infra notes 30-32
and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of the EPA's regulations, see infra notes 36-48 and
accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the holding of Riverkeeper II, see infra notes 25-29
and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of the holding of Riverkeeper II, see infra notes 25-29
and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of OIRA's regulatory functions and criticism of
improper interference, see infra notes 70-86, 161-69 and accompanying text.
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ings.II Part III provides information about the EPA, CWA, OIRA,
proposed regulations under the CWA, and framework for judicial
review. 12 Part IV contains narrative discussion of the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning for its holdings. 13 Part V provides a critical analysis
of the Second Circuit's logic and a potential alternative for judicial
review. 14 Part VI outlines the projected impact this case will have
on the EPA, CWA, and future jurisprudence. 15
II. FACTS
As the court opined quite bluntly, "[t]his is a case about fish."16
Power plants and industrial organizations withdraw water from riv-
ers, lakes and other waterways of the United States to cool their
energy-producing facilities.' 7 This procedure extracts billions of
gallons of water per day, thereby impinging (trapping large orga-
nisms against grills or screens) and entraining (sucking smaller or-
ganisms into the cooling device) billions of aquatic organisms per
year. 18
Riverkeeper, Inc., which is comprised of environmental
groups, states, and industry associations, petitioned for review of an
EPA rule promulgated pursuant to the CWA. 19 This rule (the
Rule) 20 regulates cooling-water intake structures at existing and de-
veloping power plants.2' Under the Rule, cooling water intake
11. For a further discussion of the facts of Riverkeeper II, see infra notes 16-29
and accompanying text.
12. For background information of Riverkeeper II, see infra notes 30-98 and ac-
companying text.
13. For a narrative analysis of Riverkeeper II, see infra notes 99-145 and accom-
panying text.
14. For a critical analysis of Riverkeeper II, see infra notes 146-63 and accompa-
nying text.
15. For a further discussion of the potential impact of Riverkeeper II, see infra
notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
16. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper II), 475 F.3d 83, 89
(2d Cir. 2007) (stating case is about fish and other aquatic organisms).
17. See id. (introducing process by which power plants and industrial opera-
tions withdraw water for cooling facilities).
18. See id. (establishing environmental effects that cooling water technologies
have on aquatic organisms).
19. See id. at 90 (discussing consolidated petitions for review, which address
final EPA promulgated rule regarding large, existing power plants' withdrawal of
water).
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.91-99 (suspended effective July 9, 2007) (establishing
requirements and definitions applicable to cooling water intake structures for
Phase II existing facilities).
21. See id. (establishing rule made pursuant to CWA).
3
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structures must adopt the "best technology available" (BTA) to min-
imize adverse environmental impact.22
The state and environmental petitioners in Riverkeeper II chal-
lenged the Rule on the following grounds: (1) the EPA generally
exceeded its authority in rejecting closed-cycle cooling and substi-
tuting a suite of technologies as the BTA, and more specifically, the
Agency's rejections do not deserve deference because they were im-
properly made at the direction of OIRA; (2) the EPA exceeded its
authority by allowing a ranged standard of acceptable compliance
instead of setting a numeric standard; (3) restoration measures are
not a proper means of compliance under the CWA; (4) the EPA
impermissibly construed the statute to allow cost-cost and cost-bene-
fit analysis; (5) the provisions concerning compliance via mere es-
tablishment of a "Technology Installation and Operation Plan"
(TIOP) is unauthorized and violated notice and comment require-
ments; and (6) the EPA has misclassified new constructions as ex-
isting facilities, contrary to the definitions previously established,
without providing adequate periods for notice and comment.23
The industry petitioners in Riverkeeper II, on the other hand,
challenged the Rule on the following grounds: (1) the CWA section
in question does not apply to existing facilities; (2) the record insuf-
ficiently supports the EPA's definition of adverse environmental im-
pact; (3) the record insufficiently supports the EPA's zero
entrainment survival assumption; (4) the EPA did not account for
the unfair effects of the Rule on nuclear plants; (5) the Rule gave
inadequate notice of the provision regarding independent suppli-
ers of cooling-water; and (6) the EPA gave improper notice regard-
ing the definition of Great Lakes. 24
22. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 90 (discussing rule made pursuant to CWA).
23. See id. at 96 (identifying state and environmental petitioners' arguments).
24. See id. (presenting arguments of industry petitioners, Entergy Corpora-
tion, the Utility water Act Group and PSEG Fossil LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC).
This Note mainly will focus on the environmental and state petitioners' arguments.
The industrial petitioners' arguments amounted to minimal substantive discussion.
The court rejected Entergy's argument that the EPA lacked authority to apply
§ 316(b) to existing facilities and deferred to the EPA's reasonable interpretation
pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Chevron v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also Riverkeeper IL, 475 F.3d at
123. The court found Riverkeeper I controlling and denied PSEG's definition of
"Adverse Environmental Impact" argument, finding the argument substantially
similar to those previously raised and rejected in Riverkeeper I. See Riverkeeper I, 475
F.3d at 124. The court rejected the industrial petitioners' argument regarding the
EPA's zero entrainment survival assumption and deferred to the EPA's judgment.
See id. at 127. The court rejected Entergy's contention that the Phase II rule is
arbitrary and capricious because it places disproportionate impact on nuclear
plants. See id. at 128. The court held the EPA failed to give proper notice with
4
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In response to the environmental and industrial petitioners'
claims, the Second Circuit found that cost-benefit analysis could not
be the single deciding factor in choosing the BTA.25 The Second
Circuit remanded the site-specific, cost-cost variance, and TIOP
provision due to an inadequate period for notice and comment.26
The Second Circuit also remanded the provisions that set per-
formance standards as ranges without demanding best efforts in re-
ducing environmental impact, allowed compliance through
restoration measures, and authorized site-specific, cost-benefit vari-
ances.27 On remand, the Second Circuit directed the EPA to use
the definition supplied under Phase I for existing facilities, or if
amending the definition, to allow a proper period for notice and
comment.28 Finally, the Second Circuit dismissed the challenge to
the definition of Great Lakes for lack of jurisdiction.29
III. BACKGROUND
A. The EPA and CWA
The EPA was created in 1970, by a presidential reorganization
order.30 As an independent agency, the EPA's main purpose was to
regards the Rule's independent suppliers of cooling water provision. See id. at 129;
see also Nat'l Black Media Coal. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d
Cir. 1986) (stating final rule need not exactly replicate proposed rule in Notice,
but must be logical outgrowth of proposed rule). Finally, the court dismissed
UWAG's definition of "Great Lakes" argument for lack of jurisdiction. See
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 130.
25. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 130 (remanding EPA's determination of best
technology available for clarification). Cost can be used as a factor in choosing the
best technology available, however, it can only be used in a limited way. Id. at 99.
26. See id. at 130-31 (remanding cost-cost and TIOP provisions because failed
to give proper notice).
27. See id. at 131 (remanding provisions that court found impermissibly con-
structed under statute).
28. See id. at 131 (holding period is necessary for notice and comment).
We remand as based on impermissible constructions of the statute those
provisions that (1) set performance standards as ranges without requiring
facilities to achieve the greatest reduction of adverse impacts they can;
(2) allow compliance through restoration measures; and (3) authorize a
site-specific cost-benefit variance as impermissible under the statute. See
id.
29. See id. at 131 (dismissing "Great Lakes" definition challenge). There was
no evidence present that the EPA had issued a formal and binding definition of
"Great Lakes." Id. at 130. Relying on the Seventh Circuit's holding in Am. Paper
Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, the court held that absent "a formal and bind-
ing rule or some other final agency action, judicial review is not available at this
time." Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 130; see also Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 882 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1989).
30. SeeJerry S. Riggs, Note, Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of the AirForce Anchors Away:
The Potential for Non-Extraterritorial Statutory Application to Contaminate the Environ-
2008]
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lead an attack on environmental pollution. 31 During the 1980s, the
EPA moved from a sedentary role of liaison between Congress and
the public to a more aggressive role as a rule creator and
enforcer. 32
Increasing public concern about water quality and pollution
led to the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments (FWCPA). 33 In 1977, the FWPCA became known as
the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act).34 The CWA structured the reg-
ulation of pollutant discharges and authorized the EPA to imple-
ment various pollution control standards.35
B. §§ 316(b), 301 and 306 of the CWA
The Clean Water Act utilizes technology-based regulation to
clean up national waterways and control pollution. 36 Under CWA
§ 316(b), the EPA sets technological standards for cooling-water de-
vices, which take in water to cool power plant facilities. 37 Section
316(b) reads:
Any standard established pursuant to section 1311 of this
title [CWA section 301] or section 1316 of the title [CWA
section 306] and applicable to a point source shall require
that the location, design, construction, and capacity of
cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental impact. 38
ment and International Relations, 18 ViL.. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 48 (2007) (citing NANcy K.
KUBASEK & GARY S. SILVERMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 81 (Natalie Anderson ed.,
Prentice-Hall 1994) (2d ed. 1997)) (discussing EPA's history); see also Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (July 9, 1970), www.epa.gov/history/
org/origins/reorg.htm (noting presidential intent to establish EPA).
31. See Riggs, supra note 30, at 48 (providing EPA's main purpose).
32. See id. (discussing EPA's shift from relatively subdued governmental or-
ganization to an advocate of regulation and reform).
33. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, History of the Clean Water Act, http://www.epa.
gov/lawsregs/laws/cwahistory.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008) (stating public pol-
icy behind enacting FWCPA).
34. See id. (discussing 1977 amendments now known as CWA).
35. See id. (explaining EPA's authority granted under CWA).
36. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper I), 358 F.3d
174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing technology based regulation).
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006) (establishing EPA's duty to regulate cool-
ing-water facilities). Section 1326(a) addresses effluent limitations for protection
of shellfish, fish and wildlife. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Section 1326(c) establishes a
time period of protection from more stringent effluent limitations. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(c).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
6
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Section 316(b) establishes that cooling-water intake structures
must adopt the "best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact" (BTA).3 9 Provisions cross-referenced in
§ 316(b) direct the EPA to issue rules regulating pollution dis-
charge from new and existing point sources. 4° A "point source" is
defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance...
from which pollutants are or may be discharged."14 1
Cross-referenced § 301 requires the EPA to set effluent limits
(wastewater limits) for existing sources based on "the best practica-
ble control technology currently available" (BPT) .42 By 1989, ex-
isting source effluent limitations were supposed to be based on the
more stringent "best available technology economically achievable"
(BAT) standard. 43 Cross-referenced § 306 requires the EPA to es-
tablish "standards of performance" to control pollutant discharge
39. See id. (establishing "best technology available" standard).
40. See id. (discussing facilities to be regulated).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006) (defining "point source").
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(A) (establishing best practicable control tech-
nology currently available). Section 1311(b) (1) (A) reads:
[N]ot later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for point sources, other
than publicly owned treatment works, (i) which shall require the applica-
tion of the best practicable control technology currently available as de-
fined by the Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b) of this title, or (ii)
in the case of a discharge into a publicly owned treatment works which
meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, which
shall require compliance with any applicable pretreatment requirements
and any requirements under section 1317 of this title.
Id.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (2) (A) (describing best technology available). Section
1311 (b) (2) (A) reads:
[F] or pollutants identified in subparagraphs (C), (D), and (F) of this par-
agraph, effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources,
other than publicly owned treatment works, which (i) shall require appli-
cation of the best available technology economically achievable for such
category or class, which will result in reasonable further progress toward
the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants, as deter-
mined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator pursu-
ant to section 1314(b)(2) of this title, which such effluent limitations
shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if the Admin-
istrator finds, on the basis of information available to him (including in-
formation developed pursuant to section 1325 of this title), that such
elimination is technologically and economically achievable for a category
or class of point sources as determined in accordance with regulations
issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b) (2) of this title,
or (ii) in the case of the introduction of a pollutant into a publicly owned
treatment works which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) of
this paragraph, shall require compliance with any applicable pretreat-
ment requirements and any other requirement under section 1317 of this
title.
36320081
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from new sources based on "the best available demonstrated con-
trol technology. '44
C. Regulations Pursuant to the CWA
In 1977, the Fourth Circuit remanded, on procedural grounds,
the EPA's initial attempt to regulate pursuant to § 316(b). 45 Many
years passed without new rules, and environmental groups sued the
EPA, winning a consent decree. 46 In adherence to the consent de-
cree, the EPA adopted a three-phase timetable to issue pollution
discharge regulations.47 Phase I governs new facilities, Phase II -
the Rule in question - covers larger, existing power plants, while
Phase III aims to regulate existing power plants not addressed in
Phase II, as well as other industrial facilities.48
In December 2001, the EPA issued its first rule for Phase I, to
govern cooling-water intake structures for new facilities.49 The
Phase I rule established two tracks of compliance for cooling-water
intake structures: Track I sets national intake capacity and velocity
standards and facilitates closed-cycle cooling technology; Track II
provides that alternative technologies may be used, as long as the
facility can demonstrate "that the technologies employed will re-
duce the level of adverse environmental impact" to a level compara-
ble to the capacity and velocity standards in Track 1.50 In the first
44. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a) (1) (noting standard). This standard "reflects the
greatest degree of effluent reduction". Id. For a further discussion of
§ 1316(a) (1), see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
45. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 1977)
(remanding EPA's regulation on procedural grounds). In Appalachian Power, peti-
tions were filed for judicial review of the EPA's regulation concerning cooling
water intake structures. Id. at 454. The fourth circuit held that a determination of
the regulation on the merits was not presently available due to procedural errors
and would have constituted an advisory opinion prohibited by Article III of the
Constitution. Id. at 459. The court remanded to the EPA in part and denied peti-
tioners' claims in part. Id.
46. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper I), 475 F.3d 83, 90
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting consent decree). A consent decree is generally understood
as a voluntary, judge approved agreement between two parties in lieu of litigation.
See BLAcK's LAw DicrioNAY 184 (3rd Pocket ed. 2006).
47. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Whitman, No. 93 Civ. 0314, 2001 WL 1505497, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001) (discussing timetable established for promulgating
Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III rules pursuant to § 1316(b) of United States
Code).
48. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 90 (citing Riverkeeper, 2001 WL 1505497, at
*1) (stating role of phase rules).
49. See Regulations Addressing Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facil-
ities; Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
125) (establishing phase I of a three phase rule).
50. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper 1), 358 F.3d 174, 183
(2d Cir. 2004) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.84 (2003)). Section 125.84 of the Code of
8
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decision involving Riverkeeper, Inc., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States
EPA (Riverkeeper/),51 environmental, state and industry groups chal-
lenged Phase I of the Rule. 52 The Court found the second restora-
tion option inconsistent with § 316(b), holding the EPA
impermissibly exceeded its authority in allowing compliance with
Phase I via restoration measures. 53
D. Phase II
In July 2004, the EPA issued a final Rule regulating cooling-
water intake structures at large existing power plants.54 Phase II
covers existing facilities that are point sources and, as their primary
activity:
both generate and transmit electric power [or] ... gener-
ate and sell electric power for transmission [or]. . . pro-
pose to use cooling water intake structures with a total
design intake flow of 50 million gallons per day or more
[and]... use at least 25 percent of water withdrawn exclu-
sively for cooling purposes.55
Phase II has five compliance alternatives: (1) using a closed
cycle re-circulating system or reducing maximum through-screen
Federal Regulations establishes the compliance alternatives under the Phase I
Rule. 40 C.F.R. § 125.84. Under § 125.84(a) (1), the owner or operator of a new
facility must comply with Track I or Track II, which are respectively detailed in
subsections (b)-(e). 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(b)-(e).
51. 358 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2004).
52. Id. at 183 (stating petitioner's claims). The court entertained claims simi-
lar to claims in the current case. See id. The environmental petitioners asserted
that the EPA Phase I provisions conflicted with the CWA in that: (1) Track II provi-
sions set lower standards than Track I provisions; (2) Variance provisions were
precluded under the statute; and (3) dry cooling is the BTA. Id. Industry petition-
ers had eight claims that challenged the Phase I Rule as being overly flexible,
vague, contradictory and unsupported by the statute. Id.
53. See id. at 189 (holding that restoration option was inconsistent with
§ 1326(b) of the United States Code because restoration had nothing to do with
cooling water intake structure's location, design, construction, or capacity).
54. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System - Final Regulations to
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures as Phase II Existing
Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 125)
(establishing Phase II rule, which covers existing facilities at point sources that
primarily generate and transmit or generate and sell electricity).
55. 40 C.F.R. § 125.91 (suspended July 9, 2007). This section is applicable to
'existing facilities' that are point sources. See id. The definition of "Existing Facil-
ity" and other special definitions are supplied in § 125.93. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.93
(suspended July 9, 2007). For a further discussion of point source, see supra note
41 and accompanying text.
2008]
9
Rasmussen: Major D'oh: OIRA's Influence over the EPA's Regulatory Decision M
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
366 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIX: p. 357
design intake velocity to 0.5 feet per second; 56 (2) demonstrating
that existing facilities meet specified performance standards and/
or restoration requirements; 57 (3) demonstrating that the applicant
has selected, has installed, or will install and operate an approved
technology pursuant to performance standards and/or restoration
requirements; 58 (4) demonstrating that the applicant has installed,
or will install, and properly operate and maintain technology in ac-
cordance with § 125.99(a) or (b); 59 or (5) demonstrating that the
applicant has selected, installed and properly operated or will in-
stall and properly operate technologies, operational measures and/
or restoration measures under a site-specific determination of best
technology available. 60
The final Rule provided compliance through a range of accept-
able performance standards, as opposed to a single, numeric per-
formance standard. 61 Additionally, the Rule allowed for site-
specific compliance variances. 62 These alternatives allow cost-cost
or cost-benefit analysis in complying with performance standards. 63
The cost-cost alternative allows facilities to weigh the costs of com-
pliance against the costs considered by the Administrator. 64 The
cost-benefit alternative allows facilities to weigh the costs against the
benefits of compliance.65 In either circumstance, if there is a find-
ing that BTA technology costs greatly exceed the Administrator's
56. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.94 (suspended July 9, 2007) (iterating compliance
measures through closed cycle cooling or reduction of intake velocity).
57. See id. (stating compliance through existing measures).
58. See id. (allowing facility compliance with national standards to be based on
facility's compliance with Technology Installation and Operation Plan's
requirements).
59. See id. (elaborating compliance alternative which cites § 125.99). Section
125.99 outlines technologies, such as submerged cylindrical wedge-wire screen
technology and its alternatives, that constitute approved design and construction
technologies under § 125.94(a) (4). See 40 C.F.R § 125.99 (suspended July 9,
2007).
60. See Riverkeeper Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper I), 475 F.3d 83, 93-
94 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing proposed compliance alternatives in title 40,
§ 125.94(a) (5) of Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to Phase II Rule). Resto-
ration measures should yield ecological benefits substantially similar to results
under national performance standards. See id. at 94; see also 40 C.F.R
§ 125.94(a) (5).
61. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System - Final Regulations to
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing
Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,599 (July 9, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
125) (authorizing five alternatives for Phase II existing facilities).
62. See Riverkeeper H 475 F.3d at 94 (discussing compliance variances allowed
under § 125.94(a) (5) of Code of Federal Regulations).
63. See id. (discussing cost-cost and cost-benefit alternatives).
64. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a) (5) (i)).
65. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a) (5) (ii)).
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costs or benefits, then there is a site-specific determination of BTA
as close as practicable to national performance standards.66
The EPA's initial Rule under the CWA did not allow for cost-
cost or cost-benefit analysis and instead required state-of-the-art
technology for facilities most damaging to the environment. 67 The
initial Rule instructed fifty-nine of the largest plants in ecologically
sensitive areas to implement a closed-cycle cooling system, which
was considered the BTA.68 The Rule was subject to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs' (OIRA) review, and the
mandatory BTA requirement was absent after closed-door meetings
between the EPA and OIRA.69
E. The President, OMB, OIRA and Agency Relationships
OIRA was created in 1980 under the Paper Reduction Act,
which authorizes OIRA to reduce burdens associated with federal
government and private entity paperwork.70 Two Executive Orders,
President Reagan's 12,29171 and President Clinton's 12,866,72 dras-
tically changed the scope of OIRA's authority. Executive Order
12,291 required OIRA oversight and application of cost-benefit
analysis to agency regulations exceeding one hundred million dol-
lars. 73 Despite potential grounds for conflict, 12,291 specifically
66. See id. (discussing factors to be weighed under each variance).
67. Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FoRDHAM
URB. L.J. 1097, 1105 (2006) (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-
2002-0049, REVIEW DRAFT FOR THE PROPOSED SECTION 316(B) RULE FOR LARGE
COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURES AT EXISTING POWER GENERATING FACILITIES,
DCN 4-4005 72 (Dec 28, 2001)) (proposing requirement of closed-cycle cooling).
68. See id. at 1105 n.47 (requiring fifty nine of the most damaging plants to
adopt closed-cycle cooling).
69. See id. (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System - Pro-
posed Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures
at Phase 1I Existing Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,158 (proposed Apr. 9, 2002)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-25)).
70. See TheCRE.com, What is OIRA?, http://www.thecre.com/eu-oira/what_
is.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2008) (describing OIRA and providing links to OIRA
resources); see also [Proposed] Brief of Amicus Curiae OMB Watch in Support of
Environmental and State Petitioners at 1, Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007) (04-6692-ag(L)), available at www.law.georgetown.edu/
faculty/Heinzerling/Briefs/AmicusBrief inRiverkeeper.vEPA.pdf (describing
formation and statutory responsibilities of OIRA).
71. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), available at
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12291.
html (stating requirements when promulgating new regulations).
72. Exec. Order No. 12,886, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) available at
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/eo/eol2866.htm (reforming regulatory process).
73. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § (2) (b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981)
(stating agency regulations costing more than one hundred million dollars are
subject to cost benefit analysis); see also Brief of Environmental and State Petition-
2008]
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states that it does not displace agencies' statutory duties.74 During
the Department of Justice's review of the order, the government
contested assertions that 12,291's enactment unconstitutionally in-
terfered with agencies' obligations under established law and con-
gressional enactments: 75
The Order does not employ the Director. . . to displace
the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory func-
tions or in assessing and weighing the costs and benefits of
proposed actions ... [The Director's] power of consulta-
tion would not ... include authority to reject an agency's
ultimate judgment, delegated to it by law, that potential
benefits outweigh costs, that priorities under the statute
compel a particular course of action, or that adequate in-
formation is available to justify regulation .... 76
In 1993, Executive Order 12,886 superseded 12,291 but closely
mirrored its predecessor, similarly requiring cost-benefit analyses
and OIRA oversight.77 OIRA used 12,886 to become proactively in-
volved in agency rulemaking proceedings. 78 In 2001, the Adminis-
trator of OIRA informed the heads of several federal agencies that
it would disapprove regulations that did not comply with cost-bene-
fit analysis outlined in 12,866. 79 The Administrator applied this
policy with immediacy, and between 2001 and 2002, twenty-four of
twenty-five regulatory provisions concerning environmental, health
and safety concerns were weakened under OIRA involvement. 80
ers, supra note 70, at 3 (noting changes under President Reagan's Executive
Order).
.74. See Exec. Order 12,291 § 8(a)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981)
(addressing potential interference between agency's regulatory duties and OIRA);
see also Brief of Environmental and State Petitioners, supra note 70, at 3 (citing
Exec. Order 12, 291 § 8(a)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193) (arguing Order does not dis-
place agencies' statutory requirements).
75. See Heinzerling, supra note 67, at 4 (citing Memorandum for Honorable
David Stockman, Director, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, RE: Proposed Executive
Order on Federal Regulation (Feb. 12, 1981)) (stating enactment did not uncon-
stitutionally interfere with agencies' obligations).
76. Id. (prioritizing obligations under enactment regarding federal agencies).
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (noting enactment of Executive Order 12,866).
78. See Memorandum from John D. Graham for the President's Management
Council, Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA (Sept. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira-review-process.htmi
(utilizing Exec. Order 12,886 in agency rulemaking decisions); see also Heinzerling
supra note 67, at 5 (citing memorandum).
79. See Memorandum from John D. Graham for the President's Management
Council, supra note 78 (discussing increased OIRA involvement).
80. See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral, 77 U. COLO. L. REv.
335, 366 (2006) (illustrating that OMB review of environmental, health, and safety
12
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President Bush's Executive Order 13,422 was released on Janu-
ary 18, 2007, and further increased White House control of agency
regulation. 81 This newest Order requires each agency to have a reg-
ulatory policy office run by political appointee, who will supervise
rule development in compliance with cost-benefit framework and
presidential priorities. 82
In a separate action on April 4, 2007, President Bush, via recess
appointment, named Susan E. Dudley OIRA Administrator, despite
prior opposition to her nomination and lack of committee support
for a vote during the 109th Congressional meeting.8 3 Susan Dud-
ley's past record illustrates strong views on governmental regulation
and substantial ties to industry executives.84 She is the first OIRA
Administrator not to receive Senate confirmation. 85 Her first nota-
ble public action was to release a memo revising executive branch
policies on agency risk analysis, which trumped use of cost-benefit
analysis in OIRA's decision making process. 86
F. Judicial Review of Agency Regulation under Chevron and
Mead
Traditionally, under the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron) ,87 sub-
rules resulted in weakening regulation in twenty four out of twenty five cases); see
also Heinzerling, supra note 67, at 5 (citing Driesen article).
81. See Robert Pear, Bush Directive Increases Sway on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2O07/O1/30/washington/3Orules.html?_r=l&
ex=1170824400&en=ca3b655686fe8f97&ei=5070&emc=etal&oref=slogin (noting
increase in White House regulatory control).
82. See id. (noting role of department head under order).
83. See OMBWatch.org, Recess Appointment Makes Dudley Head of White
House Regulatory Policy Office (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/arti-
cle/articleview/3806/1/455?TopicD=1 (naming Susan E. Dudley as OIRA
Administrator).
84. See id. (discussing concerns with Susan Dudley). OMB Watch and Public
Citizen released a report that casts Dudley as ideologically opposed to government
regulation. Id. In support, they cite her emphasis on the free-market's ability to
self-correct and her support of the senior-death discount, which devalues older
individual's lives. Id. Dudley also worked with the Mercatus Center in the past
couple of years, which is an anti-regulatory think tank. Id. They contend that she
might use OIRA as a vehicle in satisfying corporate interests. Id.
85. See id. (discussing Dudley's recess appointment). This appointment cir-
cumvented the Senate's normal confirmation process and was widely criticized. Id.
86. See SUSAN E. DUDLEY & SHARON L. HAYS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Ex-
ECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-07-24, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXEC-
UTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: UPDATED PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ANALYSIS (2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/mO7-24.pdf (setting forth
principles for risk analysis).
87. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.i Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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stantive judicial review of agency regulations consists of two steps.
First, the court must examine the EPA's regulation in light of the
statute.88 If the court concludes that Congress has "unambiguously
expressed" its meaning and its intent is clear, the court must give
effect to Congress' intent.8 9 If the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, however, the question for the
court is whether the "agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."90 If the agency followed Congress' intent
or permissibly construed the statute, the court will review the regu-
lation and rulemaking record, but the court will give deference to
the agency, unless it finds the regulation arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. 91
The deference allowed under Chevron, however, is not necessa-
rily applicable to every agency statutory interpretation. 92 In 2001,
the Supreme Court departed from its stronger deferential stance in
Chevron, in deciding United States v. Mead Corporation (Mead).93 In
Mead, the Supreme Court noted that the degree of deference given
to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute can turn on a
wider array of factors, such as "the degree of the agency's care, its
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persua-
siveness of the agency's position."94
88. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper 1l), 475 F.3d 83, 95
(2d Cir. 2007) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837) (establishing court's analysis when
reviewing regulations).
89. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (stating that interpretations must give ef-
fect to expressed intent of Congress).
90. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 95 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837) (establishing
court's analysis pursuant to Chevron). "If, however, the statute is silent or ambigu-
ous, we ask whether "the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute."' Id.
91. See id. at 95-96 (noting an agency's rule must be deemed arbitrary and
capricious where agency relied on factors other than congressional intent, failed to
consider all aspects of the problem, gave explanation contrary to established evi-
dence in agency's possession, or is so egregiously implausible that could not be
product of agency expertise).
92. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 200-01 (2d
Cir. 2004). In Natural Resources Defense Council, the second circuit held a Depart-
ment of Energy's interpretation entitled to lesser deference than Chevron because
it was not based on permissible construction of a statute. See id. at 200.
93. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). The Mead Corp. opin-
ion has created a considerable amount of confusion in application amongst the
circuit courts. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1443, 1445 (addressing circuit court confusion sur-
rounding Mead Corp. versus Chevron deference to agency action).
94. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. at 228 (discussing factors in weighing agency statu-
tory interpretations). Mead Cop. provides Chevron deference if: (1) Congress dele-
gated authority to an agency generally to make rules to enforce the law; and (2) if
the "agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
14
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Finally, the court must review the procedural aspects of rule
promulgation pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) .95 The APA requires published notice of proposed rules in
the Federal Register,96 and a period for interested parties to com-
ment on proposed rules.9 7 Noncompliance with these provisions
results in remand to the promulgating agency.98
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Use of Cost in Determining "Best Technology Available"
State and environmental petitioners contended that the EPA
exceeded its authority in rejecting closed-cycle cooling as the BTA
for existing facilities because the EPA's interpretation utilized im-
permissible cost analysis, which conflicted with the CWA's plain
meaning.99 Specifically, environmental petitioners argued that the
rejection did not merit deference because the decision was made
under improper OIRA influence. 100 Closed-cycle cooling was an in-
tegral part of the original Rule proposal and the rejection of closed-
cycle cooling allegedly occured during OIRA's review process. 10 1
Environmental petitioners sought to supplement the record with
review documents indicating these impermissible changes.'
0 2
The Second Circuit noted that § 316(b) does not establish de-
terminative factors that the EPA should consider in arriving at the
that authority." See id. at 226-27. For a further discussion of factors used in Mead
Corp. analysis, see infra note 158 and accompanying text.
95. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 96 (stating procedural standards of review
under APA).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) (requiring published notice in Federal Register
of proposed rulemaking).
97. See id. at § 553(c) (requiring interested parties an opportunity for
comment).
98. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 96 (citing Sprint Corp. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n,
315 F.3d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). "Because the [agency] failed to provide ade-
quate notice and opportunity to comment, we grant the petition and remand the
case to the [agency]." Sprint Corp., 315 F.3d at 371.
99. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 96 (stating state and environmental petition-
ers' argument against EPA rejection of closed-cycle cooling). The court noted the
most significant challenge raised addressed the rejection of closed cycle cooling
and adoption of the suite of technologies, based largely on improper cost consider-
ations. See id. at 97.
100. See id. at 105 (claiming EPA's rejection of closed cycle cooling was made
at direction of OMB). Environmental petitioners argued that rejection of closed
cycle cooling for the largest facilities was an attempt to maximize net economic
benefits. See id. at 101.
101. See id. at 105 (outlining petitioners' arguments concerning OIRA).
102. See id. (addressing environmental petitioners' request to supplement re-
cord with OMB review documents).
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BTA.103 These determinative factors, however, can be reasonably
deduced from its textual similarity to the previously established
standard, "the best available technology economically achievable"
(BAT).104 The shift from the original "best practicable control
technology currently available" (BPT) 1°5 standard, to the more
stringent BAT standard, illustrated Congressional intent to adopt a
cost-effective, as opposed to a cost-benefit, analytical framework
under the CWA. 10 6 Cost-benefit analysis is not permitted under the
BAT standard, and this preclusion makes it reasonable to find that
this analysis is similarly barred under § 316(b).1 07 Regardless of in-
tent, the Second Circuit found the plain text of § 316(b) to require
the best technology available, not the most economic. 0 8
Citing its analysis in Riverkeeper I, the Second Circuit provided
that the Agency can consider cost, but not as a primary considera-
tion. 10 9 Cost can only be used to determine whether technology
can be reasonably borne by the industry, or in application of cost-
effectiveness analysis. 110 These roles should be narrowly construed
103. See id. at 97 (noting § 316(b) does not explicitly set forth factors for con-
sideration of "best technology available"). In consideration of petitioners' chal-
lenge, the court noted the necessity of determining how the EPA can consider cost
in selecting BTA. See id.
104. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 98 (discussing linguistic similarity between
BAT standard of § 301 of CWA and standard under § 306, which applies to new
sources).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (A) (2000) (stating water pollution control
standards).
106. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 98 (noting cost-benefit analysis inherent in
Congress' promulgation of environmental regulations precludes use of cost-bene-
fit analysis as major factor in choosing appropriate technology). The court noted
the difference between the means and ends of each analysis: "[c] ost-benefit analy-
sis, like BPT, compares the costs and benefits of various ends, and chooses the end
with the best net benefits. By contrast, cost-effectiveness considerations, like BAT,
determine which means will be used to reach a specified level of benefit that has
already been established." See id.
107. See id. (discussing court's rejection of cost-benefit analysis under
§ 316(b)).
108. See id. at 98-99 (concluding that plain language of § 316(b) indicates def-
inition of best technology available does not allow for cost-benefit analysis). In
establishing BTA, Congress did not expressly permit the agency to consider tech-
nological cost in light of adverse environmental impact. See id. at 99.
109. See id. at 99 (stating cost should not be primary factor in adopting
technology).
110. See id. at 99-100 (establishing permissible ways EPA may consider cost).
The EPA's technology determination should be based on optimally performing
Phase II facilities first, after which factors such as cost can be considered in finding
less expensive technologies yielding equal results. See id. at 99-100.
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol19/iss2/4
EPA's REGUI-ATORY DECISION MAKING
and conjunctively used, to find a technology-driven, as opposed to a
cost-driven, result."'
The Second Circuit found that the record failed to establish
the EPA's application of any reasoned analyses in reaching its tech-
nology conclusions. 2 The court found it "impossible to judge
whether the performance of these technologies is essentially the
same as the performance of closed-cycle cooling, or whether they
simply are cheaper per percentage point of reduction in entrain-
ment and impingement mortality."'"1 3 Accordingly, the Second Cir-
cuit remanded the Rule, stating that the EPA needed to justify its
conclusion that choosing a suite of technologies as BTA was suffi-
ciently reached. 114
This marked a bittersweet victory for the environmental peti-
tioners.115 Since the Second Circuit generally granted the petition-
ers' challenge to the EPA's BTA determination, the Court forewent
addressing environmental petitioners' arguments concerning OIRA
involvement." 16
B. Performance Standards Expressed as Ranges
The Second Circuit found that performance standards could
be expressed as ranges. 1 7 The EPA, however, must require facili-
ties to minimize adverse environmental impact to the best possible
111. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 (discussing difference between technol-
ogy-driven and impermissible cost-driven analysis). Selection of BTA on cost-bene-
fit analysis is impermissibly cost-driven, while selection based partially on cost-
effectiveness analysis can remain technology driven. See id. at 99; see also Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 822 F.2d 104, 123 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding CWA's most salient characteristic is that it is technology driven).
112. See Riverkeeper I, 475 F.3d at 102 (finding unclear whether EPA improp-
erly used cost-benefit analysis). The court noted as important the omission of the
word "practicable" under the more stringent BAT standard. Id. This omission pre-
cludes the use of cost-benefit analysis, yet the EPA interpreted the statute to re-
quire "practicability" analysis. Id. Further, in adopting the suite of technologies
alternative to closed-cycle cooling, the EPA concluded suite of technologies were
the most cost effective option in a convoluted three part explanation. Id.
113. Id. at 104 (finding record lacks needed information on EPA decision-
making process).
114. See id. at 105 (remanding to EPA for agency explanation on its conclu-
sions in adopting suite of technologies over closed-cycle cooling). "In a technical
area of this sort, it is difficult for judges or interested parties to determine the
propriety of the Agency's action without a justification for the action supported by
clearly identified substantial evidence whose import is explained." Id. at 103-04.
115. See id. at 105 (rejecting environmental petitioners' claim to strike and/or
supplement record).
116. See id. (denying motions to strike and supplement motions to strike as
moot). I
117. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 105 (holding, nothing barred EPA from ex-
pressing standards as ranges).
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degree.118 As instituted, the Rule does not require facilities to
adopt technologies that yield the greatest possible reduction.1 19
In Riverkeeper I, the court concluded that mathematical inability
to measure a particular technology's performance with precision
made it reasonable to consider a margin of error within a perform-
ance standard.1 20 Unlike Riverkeeper I, the performance standard
here allowed for a range of technologies and performances based
on local conditions. 121
The Court acknowledged the difficulty of predicting which fa-
cilities could meet the upper ranges of performance. 122 This diffi-
culty, however, cannot justify a facility's compliance when it meets
the lower end of the range, if the facility could meet the higher
end. 12 3 Best technology cannot be construed to mean second
best.124 If the EPA is to use performance ranges, it must establish
the ranges in accordance with the technology's best possible level
of performance. 25
118. See id. (stating Rule failed to require facilities' reduction of adverse envi-
ronmental impacts associated with their cooling water intake structures to best de-
gree possible).
119. See id. (noting performance standards as written do not require facilities'
achievement of best possible level of adverse environmental impact minimization).
In anticipation of changing BTA on remand, the court provided the EPA guidance
in future challenges to regulatory authority. Id. at 108.
120. See Riverkeeper v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper 1), 358 F.3d 174, 189
(2d Cir. 2004) (noting inaccuracy of measuring impingement and entrainment).
121. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 107 (noting differences between two per-
formance standards). In Riverkeeper I, the issue was a margin of error associated
with measuring the end result of chosen technologies. See id. Here, the perform-
ance ranges indicate differences in the actual performance of technologies in
achieving results. See id.
122. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 107 (noting predictions difficult given vari-
ous facilities).
123. See id. (discussing effects of compliance standard ranges).
124. See id. at 107-08 (analyzing compliance standard ranges). "The statutory
directive requiring facilities to adopt the best technology cannot be construed to
permit a facility to take measures that produce second-best results ... especially
given the technology-forcing imperative behind the Act .... Id. at 107-08 (citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 822 F.2d 104, 123 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (internal citations omitted).
125. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 107-08 (establishing necessity of best possi-
ble level of impingement and entrainment reduction EPA determines chosen tech-
nologies can achieve).
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C. Compliance through Restoration Measures
The EPA exceeded its authority in allowing plants to use resto-
ration measures to meet national standards. 26 Primarily, the court
relied on its prior holding in Riverkeeper I, in which it found restora-
tion measures inconsistent with the plain meaning of the text of
§ 316(b) and the section's legislative history.1 27 Despite the EPA's
contentions that Riverkeeper I should not be binding, the court
noted that where statutory language is unambiguous, as is the case
here, the plain meaning of the text is binding.
28
Even if Riverkeeper I was non-binding, the court mused that its
prior reasoning as applied to this case would still be persuasive.
129
Restoration provisions contradict Congress' clear intent, because
restoration measures have nothing to do with the location, design
or construction of cooling-water intake structures. 130 The EPA's al-
lowance of compliance with § 316(b) via restoration measures was
an impermissible interpretation of the statute.
131
D. Site Specific Cost-Cost Compliance Alternative
In the EPA's proposal Rule, compliance costs were provided
for model plants based on geographic and operational factors.
13 2
The final Rule, however, designated estimated costs to specified fa-
cilities, rather than model facilities.' 33 Thus the proposed Rule did
not provide for required adequate notice of the costs associated
with specific facilities named in the final Rule. 134 The final Rule
should be a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule, as agencies
126. See id. at 108 (establishing that facilities must use full potential to mini-
mize adverse impact).
127. See id. at 110 (citing holding of Riverkeeper land discussing language of
§ 316(b)).
128. See id. at 109 (citing Chevron test). "We agree with the petitioners that
Riverkeeper I held that the Agency's decision to permit restoration measures in the
Phase I Rule was not 'based on a permissible construction of the statute,' and that
this holding applies equally here." Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. 843).
129. See Riverkeeper l, 475 F.3d at 109 (finding restoration measures contradict
the unambiguous language of § 316(b)).
130. See id. (applying reasoning from Riverkeeper 1).
131. See id. at 110 (finding restoration measures are not viable compliance
alternatives).
132. See id. at 112 (noting EPA's proposed rules weighed factors such as fuel
sources, means of electricity generation, intake devices, location, waterbody type,
and volume of intake).
133. See id. (reviewing history of Rule and outcome of final Rule).
134. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 112-13 (stating importance of notice re-
quirement). The Court provided that "[n]otice is said not only to improve the
quality of rulemaking through exposure of a proposed rule to comment, but also
to provide fairness to interested parties and to enhance judicial review by the de-
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are not permitted to "pull a surprise switcheroo."13 5 Because inter-
ested parties were not allowed an opportunity to comment on the
EPA's established costs for specified facilities, this section was re-
manded on procedural grounds. 13 6
E. TIOP Provision Compliance
Similar to the site specific cost-cost variance provided above,
the EPA's first Rule regarding a Technology Installation and Opera-
tional Plan (TIOP) was markedly different from its final proposed
Rule. 137 The first Rule allowed for an extended period to comply
with national standards under a TIOP.138 The final Rule stated that
once a TIOP was established, there was an indefinite period to meet
performance standards.1 39 Due to the failure to provide notice, the
Second Circuit remanded this provision of the Rule on procedural
grounds. 140
F. Site Specific Cost-Benefit Compliance Alternative
As previously noted, the use of cost is limited under § 316(b)
in determining the BTA.141 Additionally, the court found the cost-
benefit alternative impermissible because it authorized the EPA to
weigh the quality of a waterway in determining the best technology
available and granting variances.' 42 Under this method, a facility
would be able to avoid compliance through a showing of dismal
velopment of a record through the commentary process". Id. (citing Nat'l Black
Media Coal. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d Cir. 1986)).
135. Id. at 113 (applying Nat'l Black Media Coal., 791 F.2d at 1022 and Envtl.
Integrity Project v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005) to
present case).
136. See id. at 113 (remanding variance for inadequate notice). "The EPA
should have afforded notice and an opportunity to challenge the cost estimates for
specific facilities and not simply an opportunity to comment on the EPA's method-
ology and general cost data." Id.
137. See id. at 116 (describing differences in TIOP section of proposed rule).
138. Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures, 68 Fed. Reg. at
13,586 (Mar. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 125) (stating time period for
compliance under TIOP).
139. See How will requirements reflecting best technology available for mini-
mizing adverse environmental impact be established for my Phase II existing facil-
ity?, 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(d) (2) (2007) (stating facility could be given an indefinite
period of compliance with performance standards under a TIOP) (suspended July
9, 2007).
140. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 116-17 (remanding Phase II Rule with re-
gards to TIOP section on procedural grounds).
141. For a further discussion of the use of cost, see supra notes 99-111 and
accompanying text.
142. See RiverkeeperI, 475 F.3d at 114 (stating consideration of water quality in
selecting site-specific BTAs is impermissible).
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water quality that did not justify the costs of implementing new
technology. 143 In such an environment, the benefit of saving a few
aquatic organisms would be outweighed by the costs of updating an
existing water-cooling structure.144 Parallel to Riverkeeper I, the
court maintained its position that such a regulation is impermissi-
ble, and remanded this aspect of the Rule. 145
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The court effortlessly analogized the current case to its prior
holdings in Riverkeeper I, but found the EPA's decision-making pro-
cess void of any supporting analysis in the final Rule's shift away
from closed-cycle cooling.146 The court remanded a majority of the
Rule's provisions for change or analytical elaboration. 147 The
EPA's last minute shifts regarding these provisions lacked the infor-
mation necessary for proper judicial review. 1 48
There are several indications that these last-minute changes
were not the EPA's decision at all but results of illegal interference
from OIRA. 14 9 Specifically, the regulation provisions that allow
weighing costs in determination of the BTA are indicative of inter-
ference from OIRA. 150 The documents that would prove, or deny,
such a relationship were withheld in both Riverkeeper II and
Riverkeeper L151 Since the Second Circuit granted Petitioners' chal-
143. See id. at 115 (noting compliance could be met under this rule through
showing previously degraded water quality and low levels of wildlife).
144. See id. (demonstrating how particular Phase II Rule provisions would op-
erate if enacted).
145. See id. (noting Congress previously rejected regulation that would weigh
water quality as a factor in determining BTA).
146. See id. at 105 (finding EPA's reasoning unclear). In discussing rejection
of closed cycle cooling, the court noted: the "EPA may have simply either failed to
perform the required analysis or to explain adequately a decision that was within
its authority to make. We cannot opine on this subject, because we must consider
only those justifications that the EPA offered at the time of the rulemaking." Id.
147. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 130-31 (remanding sections of Phase II Rule
to EPA).
148. For a further discussion of judicial review in Riverkeeper II, see supra notes
104-09 and accompanying text.
149. See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FoRD-
HAM UB. L.J. 1097, 1097 (2006) (stating that OIRA did not give deference to
EPA's interpretation and illegally interfered with this interpretation in their review
of Phase II Rule).
150. See id. at 1105-106 (discussing various changes to initially proposed rule
made during OIRA review). For a further discussion of OIRA's policies, see infra
note 84 and accompanying text.
151. See Heinzerling, supra note 149, at 1117 (discussing EPA's position that
documents concerning meeting between the EPA and OIRA should not be admit-
ted to record).
2008]
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lenge to the determination of BTA and held the petitioners' argu-
ments concerning OIRA involvement moot, the court bypassed the
opportunity to address this underlying conflict. 152
The Second Circuit gave deference to its analysis in Riverkeeper
I, which relied heavily on the application of the Chevron test.153 The
Chevron test is proper if the EPA is the sole agency responsible for
constructing the Phase II Rule.154 This application, however, is not
appropriate if OIRA usurps the EPA's regulatory power in inter-
preting section 316(b). 155 In a circumstance where evidence pro-
vides a reasonable belief that OIRA usurped the EPA's regulatory
interpretation, giving Chevron deference to the EPA would be inap-
propriate.1 56 In such a circumstance, it would be reasonable for the
court to apply the Mead standard in deciding the appropriate
weight given to the EPA's interpretation. 157
Application of the Mead standard would look to circumstantial
evidence, such as "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the
agency's position."1 58 Instead of a facial review of the statute's plain
text and the EPA's rulemaking record, EPA decisions could be
weighed in light of the validity of its reasoning and other circum-
stantial factors. 159 Such an examination could allow a court flexibil-
ity to address this inter-agency dispute. 160  Nevertheless, as
Riverkeeper I and the current case have shown, the EPA's reluctance
to share evidentiary analysis supporting its decision-making process
has amounted to nothing more than a Phase II Rule volley between
the EPA and the Second Circuit.
Even if the EPA were fully cooperative in producing docu-
ments supporting its decision to adopt a suite of technologies, it
152. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 105 (holding moot petitioner's arguments
concerning OIRA's role in interagency review).
153. See id. at 95-96 (stating standard of review under Chevron analysis).
154. See id. at 96 (stating deference to EPA under Chevron).
155. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S.
144, 152-53 (1991) (holding that when two executive agencies disagree, agency
with greatest authority under statute deserves deference).
156. See Heinzerling, supra note 149, at 1114 (stating Mead Corp. is appropri-
ate standard in giving deference to the EPA).
157. See id. (concluding application of Mead Corp. analysis more appropriate
than Chevron analysis). For a further discussion of application of Mead Corp. analy-
sis to agency regulations, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
158. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).
159. See id. (discussing factors weighed under Mead Corp. analysis).
160. See Heinzerling, supra note 149, at 1114-117 (discussing application of
Mead Corp. standard).
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still might be difficult to verify OIRA's changes.' 6' Agencies are re-
quired to document changes made while under OIRA review, but
documentation is consistently inadequate. 6 2 Documents noting
OIRA changes are not made available online, are not properly in-
dexed to indicate OIRA involvement, and are often are unreported
by Agencies. 163
VI. IMPACT
The holding in Riverkeeper II does not significantly depart from
the Court's prior holding in Riverkeeper 1.164 The effect is subtle, yet
compelling. Judicial review of agency regulations has been histori-
cally narrow, but this Second Circuit decision is a steadfast state-
ment prohibiting approval of regulations that are improperly
supported by the administrative record. 65
The EPA's conflict with environmental groups and the judicial
branch has changed little over the past thirty years. 166 The interest-
ing question is whether this current conflict is indicative of the
EPA's inability to properly choose and analytically support its regu-
lations, or OIRA's, and proximately, big business' deregulation
policies.
The Second Circuit's decision is merely a small piece of a puz-
zling relationship that affects the majority of governmental agen-
cies. 167 OIRA's centralized oversight of agency regulation has
161. See OMBWatch.org, Changes Difficult to Document (Sept. 4, 2002),
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1073/ (noting difficulty in assess-
ing OIRA's involvement due to OIRA's uniform reporting policy). OIRA changes
made for regulatory clarity, such as added punctuation, are reported no differently
than substantive changes effecting the regulation's nature. Id.
162. See id. (discussing inadequacy of OIRA regulation change
documentation).
163. See id. (noting lack of publication of OIRA's regulation changes).
164. Compare Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper I), 475 F.3d
83, 130 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding petitioners' petitions granted in part, denied in
part, and remanding provisions to EPA for reasoned explanation of decisions),
with Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (Riverkeeper 1), 358 F.3d 174,
205 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding petitioners' petitions granted in part and denied in
part, and remanding provisions to EPA that allowed compliance via "restoration
measures").
165. For a full discussion of the court's analysis and sections remanded to the
EPA, see supra notes 99-145 and accompanying text.
166. Compare Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 1977)
(remanding EPA's regulation on procedural grounds), with Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d
at 130 (remanding selected portions of EPA's Phase II regulation to EPA for fur-
ther explanation).
167. See Nicholas Bagley, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 1260, 1260 (2006) (stating issues involved with OMB oversight of agency
regulation).
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grown in frequency and strength, particularly under the Bush ad-
ministration. 168 The President's most current Executive Order,
combined with the recent appointment of Susan Dudley, has sev-
eral critics fearful of a further increase in OIRA deregulatory ac-
tions. 169 This fear derives from a fundamental difference in
analytical allegiance of each respective side. While OIRA's involve-
ment in federal regulatory affairs often reveals a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach in which cost-benefit analysis is necessarily best, OIRA's
opponents realize that the most economic option is not always best,
and often undermines congressional intent underlying the CWA. 170
These concerns are certainly justified, because after all, costs
and benefits are inevitably tied to one's own interests. For example,
in THE SIMPSONS MOVIE, the plot is thickened by protagonist Ho-
mer's insatiable desire for pastries. 171 On his way to properly dis-
pose of some hazardous waste, he receives a phone call announcing
that his favorite pastry establishment is distributing free donuts.'7 2
Unsurprisingly, Homer chooses to forgo the proper disposal tech-
niques of the material, opting to dump it into severely polluted
Lake Springfield in expedience of a donut feast.'7 3
Homer's lackluster cost-benefit analysis would have been ar-
guably appropriate under the EPA's proposed cost benefit compli-
ance alternative. Homer could evidence the immediate benefit of
attaining pastries, which strongly outweighed the costs associated
with proper disposal of the hazardous waste. A factor such as the
already degraded water quality of Lake Springfield could bolster
Homer's argument, in establishing minimal adverse environmental
impact.
Even in the worst of situations, Homer's choices often lead to
realization and resolution. Unfortunately for us, however, the rules
of animation, television sitcoms, and bad Bill Murray movies do not
168. See Driesen, supra note 80, at 364 (discussing OMB's involvement under
President George W. Bush).
169. See OMBWatch.org, Recess Appointment Makes Dudley Head of White
House Regulatory Policy Office (April 17, 2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/arti-
cle/articleview/3806/ (discussing projected increase in regulatory actions under
new OIRA administrator).
170. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 475 F.3d 83, 114 (2d Cir. 2007)
(arguing cost-benefit compliance alternative impermissibly uses cost-benefit con-
siderations in conflict with congressional direction).
171. See THE SIMPSONS MOVIE (20th Century Fox 2007) (establishing movie's
basic plotline).
172. See id. (recanting phone conversation leading to Homer's disposal of
hazardous waste into Lake Springfield).
173. See id. (noting Homer's disposal of hazardous waste into Lake
Springfield).
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apply to our lives, and life does not reset each time we reach the
end of a conflict. The impact of allowing such inane cost-benefit
analysis would be environmentally horrifying.
While it is questionable whether OIRA should be heavily in-
volved in agency regulation, one thing is clear: the dealings be-
tween the EPA and OIRA lack necessary transparency for effective
judicial review. 174 The Second Circuit established, yet again, that it
will continue to remand regulations if there are procedural or evi-
dentiary errors.1 75 A future application of Mead, instead of Chevron,
might encourage stronger analytical support while still giving defer-
ence to constitutional and prudential boundaries ofjudicial review.
For now, however, the EPA's poor analytical support of proposed
regulations and lack of interagency documentation is effectively ex-
tending deadlines for major power plants, saving these plants major
money, and prolonging a thirty year EPA-Big Business D'oh for
dough transaction.
Ryan J Rasmussen
174. For a further discussion of the lack of transparency inherent in OIRA
and EPA dealings, see supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
175. For a further discussion of remanded provisions, see supra notes 25-29
and accompanying text.
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